Even after they were not prepared to attribute that state to
Even when they were not willing to attribute that state to any from the person members, and they have been willing to attribute a mental state to all members of a group even when they were not prepared to attribute that state towards the group itself. In turn, the results of Experiment 2 reveal that that such ascriptions recruit brain regions linked with pondering concerning the minds of folks, i.e brain regions related with theoryofmind, each when theoryofmind use is named for explicitly and when it arises spontaneously. Previous investigation has demonstrated constant engagement of a specific network of regions, which includes MPFC, RTPJ, and precuneus, through inferences about the minds of person persons, i.e 
during theoryofmind. Across two tasks, we observed activation within this network when participants study or created predictions about group agents. In the directed theoryofmind activity, participants read concerning the states of men and women, group agents, and inanimate objects. In each cases, activation linked with groups was indistinguishable from that associatedwith consideration of men and women. Wholebrain analyses, conjunction analysis, and ROI analyses all support the conclusion that cognitive processes linked with pondering regarding the minds ofPLOS A single plosone.orgTheoryOfMind and Group AgentsFigure 2. Conjunction analyses. Leading: A conjunction evaluation revealed conjoint activation in MPFC, TPJ (bilaterally), and precuneus when participants read concerning the mental states of individuals and groups, in comparison with a nonmental handle condition. Bottom: These regions also overlapped with these recruited by the theoryofmind localizer. Activations are displayed on a canonical brain image. doi:0.37journal.pone.00534.gindividuals have been also recruited when participants believed about the `mind’ of a group agent. However, it really is worth noting the possibility that participants may have been considering to some degree concerning the minds of individual group members, and that this might have accounted for the observed activation in theoryofmind regions through consideration of group agents. This possibility is weakened, but not absolutely ruled out, by (a) the fact that, in contrast to previous studies, no folks were pointed out or shown in the group Table 2. Regions emerging in the conjunction evaluation.situation and (b) the observation that perceivers interpret sentences about group mental states as ascribing mental states to the group agent itself in Experiment , and (c) the (RS)-Alprenolol hydrochloride chemical information recent observation that the more perceivers think about the `mind’ from the group, the significantly less they think of the minds of its members [8]. Previous analysis has documented the selectivity of the RTPJ for attributing representational mental content material, such as beliefs and intentions, to others [22,25,57,6,62], compared to other sorts of attributions, for example those regarding a person’s physical appearance, preferences, or personality traits. In this study, neither the mere presence of a person nor the need to create other varieties of inferences about that person was associated with as a great deal activation within this region as attributing representational mental states. Accordingly, the truth that the RTPJ activated indistinguishably through consideration of individuals and groups (but distinguished each from the inanimate handle situation) is an particularly compelling suggestion that participants utilized similar processes for understanding PubMed ID:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24126911 the representational mental states of people and group agents. Even though the distinct con.
